Nguyễn Cao Kỳ

In this Vietnamese name, the family name is Nguyễn, but is often simplified to Nguyen in English-language text. According to Vietnamese custom, this person should properly be referred to by the given name Kỳ.

Nguyễn Cao Kỳ pronunciation (born September 8, 1930) served as the Chief of the Vietnam Air Force in the 1960s, before leading the nation as the Prime Minister of South Vietnam in a military junta from 1965 to 1967. He then served as Vice President to bitter rival, General Nguyen Van Thieu until his retirement from politics in 1971 in a nominally-civilian administration.

Born in northern Vietnam, Ky joined the Vietnamese National Army of the French-backed State of Vietnam and started as an infantry officer before the French sent him off for pilot training. After the French withdrew from Vietnam and the nation partitioned, Ky moved up the ranks of the Vietnam Air Force to become its leader. In November 1963, Ky participated in the coup that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem and resulted in his execution. During 1964, Ky became prominent in junta politics, regarded as part of a group of young, aggressive officers dubbed the Young Turks. Over the next two years there were repeated coup attempts, many of which were successful, and Ky was a key player in supporting or defeating them. In September 1964, he helped put down a coup attempt by Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc against Nguyen Khanh, and the following February he thwarted another attempt by Phat and Pham Ngoc Thao. Ky’s favored tactic in such situations was to send fighter jets into the air and threaten large-scale air strikes, and given his reputation for impetuosity, he usually attained the desired backdown.

After the latter attempt, he also had the weakened Khanh forced into exile and eventually took the leading position in the junta in mid 1965 by becoming prime minister, while General Nguyen Van Thieu was the figurehead chief of state. During his period at the helm, Ky gained notoriety for his flamboyant manner, womanizing, risky and brash behavior, which deeply concerned South Vietnam’s American allies and angered the Vietnamese public, who regarded him as a “cowboy” and a “hooligan”.[1] He cared little for public relations, and on occasions, publicly threatened to kill dissidents and opponents, as well as flattening parts of North Vietnam and South Vietnamese units led by rival officers with bombings, although none of this materialized. However, a public threat to rig elections if necessary, was fulfilled.

Nevertheless, Ky and Thieu were able to end the cycle of coups, and the Americans backed their regime. In 1966, Ky decided to purge General Nguyen Chanh Thi, another officer in the junta regarded as his greatest rival, from a command role. This provoked major unrest, particularly in South Vietnam, where some units joined with Buddhist activists supportive of Thi and hostile to Ky in defying his junta’s rule. Three months of large-scale demonstrations and riots paralyzed parts of the country, and after much maneuvering and some military battles, Ky’s forces finally put down the uprising, and Thi was exiled, entrenching the former’s grip on power.

In 1967, a transition to elected government was scheduled and after a power struggle within the military, Thieu ran for the presidency with Ky as his running mate—both men had wanted the top job. To allow the two to work together, their fellow officers had agreed to have a military body controlled by Ky shape policy behind the scenes. The election was rigged to ensure that Thieu and Ky’s military ticket would win, and strong executive powers meant that junta effectively still ruled. Leadership tensions persisted and Thieu prevailed, sidelining Ky supporters from key military and cabinet posts. Thieu then passed legislation to restrict candidacy eligibility for the 1971 election, banning almost all would-be opponents; Ky and the rest withdrew as it was obvious that the poll would be a sham; Thieu went on to win more than 90% of the vote and the election uncontested, while Ky retired.

With the fall of Saigon, Ky fled to the US. He continued to heavily criticize both the communists and Thieu, and the former prevented him from returning. However, in 2004, he became the first South Vietnamese leader to return, calling for reconciliation between communists and anti-communists.

Contents

Early years and rise up the ranks

Us President Lyndon Baines Johnson, General William Westmoreland, Thieu and Ky together in 1966
Nguyễn Cao Kỳ
September 8, 1930 –
Place of birth Son Tay, Tonkin, French Indochina (now Ha Tay Province, Vietnam)
Allegiance Vietnamese National Army, Vietnam Air Force
Years of service 1949–1975
Rank Thiếu tướng (Air Vice-Marshal)
Commands held Vietnam Air Force (1963?–??)
Battles/wars 1963 South Vietnamese coup, September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt, February 1965 South Vietnamese coup attempt, Buddhist Uprising, Battle of Saigon (1968)
Other work Prime Minister (1965–1967), Vice President (1967–1971)

A northerner, Ky was born in Son Tay, a town west of Hanoi. After completing his secondary schooling in Hanoi, he enlisted in the French-backed Vietnamese National Army of the State of Vietnam and was commissioned in the infantry after attending an officers' training school.[2] After a brief period in the field against the communist Vietminh of Ho Chi Minh during the First Indochina War, the French military hierarchy sent Ky, then a lieutenant, to Marrakech in Morocco to train as a pilot. Ky gained his wings on September 15, 1954.[2]

The French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference ended the colonial presence in Indochina, and Ky came back to the new Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The commander of a transport squadron, Ky was put in charge of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the main aerial facility in the capital Saigon.[2] Ky then went to the United States to study for six months at the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Field in Alabama, where he learned to speak English. He returned to Vietnam and continued to rise up the ranks.[2]

A soldier in the Vietnamese National Army who eventually became commander of the South Vietnam Air Force, Prime Minister and Vice President of the Republic of Vietnam, Ky early on had little political experience or ambition. After flight training by the French, he returned to Vietnam in 1954 and held a series of commands in the South Vietnam Air Force. Under the regime of Duong Van Minh, whose coup Ky had supported, he was made an air marshal, replacing Colonel Do Khac Mai as the head of the Vietnam Air Force.[3]

The disgruntled Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc launched a coup attempt against Nguyen Khanh before dawn on September 13, using ten army battalions that they had recruited.[4] They took over the city without any firing, and used the national radio station to proclaim the deposal of Khanh's junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders.[5] Ky had two weeks earlier promised to used his planes against any coup attempt, but there was no reaction to begin with.[6] Duc mistakenly thought that Ky and his subordinates would be joining the coup, but was mistaken.[7]

However, Phat and Duc could not apprehend Khanh, who had escaped the capital and flew to the central highlands resort town of Da Lat. American officials flew after Khanh to encourage him to return to Saigon and reassert his control. He did so after they publicly released a statement through the embassy to endorse Khanh.[5] The announcement helped to deter ARVN officers from joining Lam and Duc. Khanh returned to Saigon and put down the putsch, aided mainly by Ky and the Air Force. Ky decided to make a show of force as Phat and Duc began to wilt, and he sent jets to fly low over Saigon and finish off the rebel stand.[6] He also sent two C-47s to Vung Tau to pick up two companies of South Vietnamese marines who remained loyal to Khanh. Several more battalions of loyal infantry were transported into Saigon.[6] Ky's political star began to rise.[8]

Ky and Nguyen Chanh Thi's role in putting down Phat and Duc's coup attempt gave him more leverage in Saigon's military politics. Indebted to Ky, Thi and the Young Turks for maintaining his hold on power, Khanh was now in a weaker position. Ky's group called on Khanh to remove "corrupt, dishonest and counterrevolutionary" officers, civil servants and exploitationists, and threatened to remove him if he did not enact their proposed reforms.[7] Some observers accused Ky and Thi of deliberately orchestrating or allowing the plot to develop before putting it down in order to embarrass Khanh and allow himself to gain prominence on the political stage.[8][9] In later years, Cao Huy Thuan, a professor and Buddhist activist based in the northern town of Da Nang, claimed that during a meeting with Ky and Thi a few days before the coup, the officers had discussed their plans for joining a coup against Khanh.[10]

1965–1967

Between January and February 1965, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was locked in a power struggled with junta leader General Nguyen Khanh, and began plotting a coup against Khanh, whom he thought was trying to kill him.[11] Thao consulted Ky—who wanted to seize power for himself—before the plot, and exhorted him to join the coup, but the air force chief claimed that he was remaining neutral. Thao thus believed that Ky would not intervene against him.[12] Shortly before noon on 19 February, Thao and General Lam Van Phat used around fifty tanks, and some infantry battalions to seize control of the military headquarters, the post office and the radio station of Saigon. He surrounded the home of General Khanh and Gia Long Palace, the residence of head of state Phan Khac Suu.[11][13] The ground troops also missed capturing Vietnam Air Force head Nguyen Cao Ky, who fled in a sports car with his wife and mother-in-law.[14] Ky ended up at Tan Son Nhut, where he ran into Khanh, and the pair flew off together.[15][12][16] Thao made a radio announcement stating that the sole objective of his military operation was to get rid of Khanh, whom he described as a "dictator".[11] Phat was supposed to seize the Bien Hoa Air Base to prevent Ky from mobilising air power against them.[11][17]

The attempt to seize Bien Hoa failed, and Ky circled Tan Son Nhut, threatening to bomb the rebels.[12][11] A CIA report and analysis written after the coup concluded that “Ky’s command of the air force made him instrumental” in preventing Khanh from being overrun, “until Ky changed his mind” on Khanh’s continuing hold on power.[18] Most of the forces of the III and IV Corps surrounding the capital disliked both Khanh and the rebels, and took no action.[19] At 20:00, Phat and Thao met Ky in a meeting organised by the Americans, and insisted that Khanh be removed from power. The coup collapsed when, around midnight, loyal ARVN forces swept into the city from the south and some loyal to Ky from Bien Hoa in the north. Whether the rebels were defeated or a deal was struck with Ky to end the revolt in exchange for Khanh's removal is disputed, but most analysts believe the latter.[11][20][21] Before fleeing, Thao managed a final radio broadcast, stating that the coup had been effective in removing Khanh. This was not the case yet, but after the chaos, the Armed Forces Council moved to adopt a vote of no confidence in Khanh, and Ky and Thi assumed control of the junta.[11][22]

In May 1965, a military tribunal under Ky sentenced both Thao and Phat, who had gone into hiding, to death in absentia. After the conclusion of the trial, it was announced that the Armed Forces Council would disband and give the civilians more control in running the government. As a result, Thao had little choice but to attempt to seize power from Ky in order to save himself.[23]

On 20 May, a half dozen officers and around forty civilians, predominantly Catholic, were arrested on charges of attempting to assassinate Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat and kidnap Ky among others. Several of the arrested were known supporters of Thao and believed to be abetting him in evading the authorities. In July 1965, he was reported dead in unclear circumstances; an official report claimed that he died of injuries while on a helicopter en route to Saigon, after being captured north of the city. However, it is generally assumed that he was murdered or tortured to death on the orders of some officials in Ky's junta.[23][24] In his memoirs, Ky claimed that Thao was jailed and "probably [died] from a beating".[25]

In 1965 Ky was appointed prime minister by a special joint meeting of military leaders following the voluntary resignation of civilian President Phan Khac Suu and Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat, who had been installed by the military. South Vietnam's system of government shifted to that of a strong prime minister, with General Nguyen Van Thieu becoming a figurehead president.[26] Ky ended the cycle of coups that plagued South Vietnam following the overthrow of Diem.

Ky and Thieu's military junta decided to inaugurate their rule by holding a "no breathing week".[26] They imposed censorship, closed many newspapers that published material deemed unacceptable, and suspended civil liberties. They then sidelined the civilian politicians to a "village of old trees" to "conduct seminars and draw up plans and programs in support of government policy".[27] They decided to ignore religious and other opposition groups "with the stipulation that troublemakers will be shot".[27]

The generals began to mobilize the populace into paramilitary organizations.[27] After one month, Thich Tri Quang began to call for the removal of Thieu because he was a member of Diem's Catholic Can Lao Party, decrying his "fascistic tendencies", and claiming that. Can Lao members were undermining Ky.[27]

Power struggle with Thi and Buddhist Uprising

Ky's greatest struggle came in 1966, when he dismissed General Thi, resulting in a Buddhist Uprising and military revolt in Thi's I Corps. Within the junta, Thi was seen as Ky's main competitor for influence. Many political observers in Saigon thought that Thi wanted to depose Ky, and regarded him as the biggest threat to the other officers and the junta’s stability.[28] According to Ky’s memoirs, Thi was a "born intriguer" who had "left-wing inclinations".[29] Time magazine published a piece in February 1966 that claimed that Thi was more dynamic than Ky and could seize power at any time.[30] The historian Robert Topmiller thought that Ky may have seen the article as destabilizing and therefore decided to move against Thi.[30]

The historian Stanley Karnow said of Ky and Thi: "Both flamboyant characters who wore gaudy uniforms and sported sinister moustaches, the two young officers had been friends, and their rivalry seemed to typify the personal struggles for power that chronically afflicted South Vietnam. But their dispute mirrored more than individual ambition."[31] Both were also known for their colourful red berets.[32]

There were reports that Thi was showing insubordination towards Ky. The US military commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, said that Thi once refused to report to Ky in Saigon when requested.[30] On one occasion, Ky came to I Corps to remonstrate with him in early-March, Thi addressed his staff and asked mockingly "Should we pay attention to this funny little man from Saigon or should we ignore him?"[28] Thi made this comment rather loudly, within earshot of Ky, and the Vietnamese politician Bui Diem thought that the prime minister viewed Thi’s comment as a direct challenge to his authority.[30]

A native of central Vietnam,[33] Thi was the commander of I Corps, which oversaw the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam and the 1st and 2nd Divisions.[33] He was known to have the “deep-rooted” loyalty of his soldiers.[29] A large part of the South Vietnamese military was the Regional and Popular Forces, which were militia who served in their native areas, and they appreciated a commander with a regionalistic rapport.[29] The support from the Buddhists, his troops and the regional tendencies gave Thi a strong power base and made it hard for the other generals and the Americans to move against him.[29]

Time magazine said that Thi "ran it [I Corps] like a warlord of yore, obeying those edicts of the central government that suited him and blithely disregarding the rest".[28] The historian George McTurnan Kahin said that Ky may have feared that Thi would secede from Saigon and turn central Vietnam into an independent state. The CIA analyst Douglas Pike, who worked in Vietnam, speculated that this would have been a large part of Ky’s thinking, as Vietnamese people often had strong regional tendencies.[30]

A combination of those factors resulted in Thi’s dismissal.[32] Ky mustered the support of eight of the generals on the 10-man junta, meaning that along with his vote, there were nine officers in favour of Thi’s removal.[33] With Thi the only non-supporter, Ky and his colleagues removed Thi from the junta and his corps command on March 10, 1966.[32] Ky threatened to resign if the decision was not unanimous, claiming that the junta needed a show of strength, so Thi decided to vote for his sacking.[34] The junta put Thi under house arrest pending his departure from the country, and then appointed General Nguyen Van Chuan, the erstwhile commander of 1st Division and a Thi subordinate, as the new I Corps commander.[34]

At first, Ky said that Thi was leaving the country to receive medical treatment for his nasal passages.[32] An official announcement said that the junta "had considered and accepted General Thi's application for a vacation".[28] Thi retorted that "The only sinus condition I have is from the stink of corruption."[32] Ky then gave a series of reasons for dismissing Ky, accusing him of being too left-wing, of ruling the central regions like a warlord, of having a mistress who was suspected of being a communist, and being too conspiratorial.[30] Ky did not say that Thi supported negotiations as a means of ending the war, but he did have a history of removing officials and military figures who promoted such a policy.[30]

Despite Thi's good relations with the Buddhists in his area, most notably the leading activist monk Thich Tri Quang, Ky reportedly had the monk's support for Thi's removal. If Ky thought that Thich Tri Quang would not orgnaize demonstrations against Thi's dismissal, he turned out to be wrong, as the monk used to crisis to highlight Buddhist calls for civilian rule.[35] There were claims that Thich Tri Quang had always intended to challenge Ky, regardless of whether or not Thi had been cast aside.[36]

The Americans were supportive of Ky and his prosecution of the war against the communists, and they opposed Thi, regarding him as not being firm enough against communism.[29] On the other hand, Thi did have the support of Marine Lieutenant General Lewis Walt, who commanded American forces in I Corps and was the senior adviser to Thi’s ARVN forces. This caused problems during the dispute.[29]

The dismissal caused widespread demonstrations in the northern provinces.[32] Civil unrest grew, as civil servants, disaffected military personnel, and the working under-class joined the anti-government demonstrations led by the Buddhists.[35] At first, Ky tried to ignore the demonstrations and wait for them to peter out,[35] but the problem escalated and riots broke out in some places.[32][37]

Ky gambled by allowing Thi to return to I Corps, ostensibly to restore order.[38] Ky claimed that he allowed Thi to return to his old area of command as a goodwill gesture, to keep central Vietnamese happy, and because he promised Thi a farewell visit before going into exile.[38] However, Thi received a rousing reception and the anti-Ky protesters became more fervent.[38][32] Ky then sacked the police chief of Hue, a Thi loyalist. The local policmen responded by going on strike and demonstrating against their chief's removal.[39]

The Buddhists, and other anti-junta civilian activists joined together with I Corps units supportive of Thi to form the Struggle Movement, leading to civil unrest and a halt in I Corps military operations. On April 3, Ky held a press conference during which he claimed that Da Nang was under communist control and vowed to stage a military operation to regain the territory. He thus implied that the Buddhists were communist agents.[29] He then vowed to kill the mayor of Da Nang, saying "Either Da Nang's mayor is shot or the government will fall."[39] The following evening, Ky deployed three battalions of marines to Da Nang. The marines stayed at Da Nang Air Base and made no moves against the rebels.[29] Soon after, they were joined by two battalions of Vietnamese Rangers,[40] as well as some riot police and paratroopers.[41] Ky took personal command and found that the roads leading into the city as being blocked by Buddhist civilians and pro-Thi portions of the I Corps.[41] After a stand-off, Ky realized that he could not score a decisive victory and had lost face. He arranged a meeting and media event with Thi loyalist officers, and various Struggle Movement supporters.[41]

The humiliated Ky arrived back in Saigon, where he met with Buddhist leaders for negotiations. The Buddhists demanded an amnesty for rioters and mutinous soldiers, and for Ky to withdraw the marines from Da Nang back to Saigon.[35] The monks said they would order the Struggle Movement "temporarily suspend all forms of struggle to prove our good will".[35][39]

After a period of tension and further tensions, Ky's forces gained the upper hand in May, pressuring most Struggle Movement members to give up and militarily defeating the rest. He then put Thich Tri Quang under house arrest and finally had Thi exiled, cementing his junta's grip on power and ending the Buddhist movement as a political force.[42][43]

During his rule, Ky made many foreign state visits to bolster South Vietnam's legitimacy. One visit to Australia in 1967 was somewhat controversial. Over time, Australian attitudes towards South Vietnam became increasingly negative, despite a contribution of ground troops to assist the fight against the communists. Over time, the bipartisanship of the 1950s evaporated.[44] The centre-left Australian Labor Party became more sympathetic to the communists and their leader Arthur Calwell stridently denounced Ky as a "fascist dictator" and a "butcher" ahead of his 1967 visit[45] Despite the controversy leading up to the visit, Ky's trip was a success. He dealt with the media effectively, despite hostile sentiment from some sections of the press and public.[46]

During the trip to Australia, a power struggle with General Nguyen Huu Co, the Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, climaxed.[47] Ky saw Co as a political threat and a magnet for dissidents,[47] while Co deemed Ky to be "immature".[33] At the same time as his visit to Australia, Ky sent Co to Taiwan, ostensibly to represent the junta at a ceremonial event. With Co out of the country and unable to stage a coup, and Ky not within striking distance in case anyone wanted to capture him, news of Co's removal was broken in Saigon.[47] Co expressed a desire to return to Saigon, but was threatened with arrest and trial, and soldiers were deployed to airport.[47] Co was allowed to return in 1970 after Ky's power had waned.[33]

1967 elections

In the presidential election that was held in 1967, the military junta, which Ky chaired, intended to only endorse one candidate for the presidency. Ky intended to run, but at the last minute changed his mind and backed Thieu,[48] a move he now calls "the biggest mistake of my life".[49] Thieu nominated Ky as his running mate and the two were elected with 35% of the vote in a rigged poll.[48] American policymakers heard rumors that the generals had agreed to subvert the constitution, and The New York Times revealed the formation of a secret military committee that would control the government after the election.[1] What had happened was that in the negotiations within the military, Ky had agreed to stand aside in exchange for behind-the-scenes power through a military committee that would shape policy and control the civilian arm of the government.[50] Ky flatly denied these reports to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the US Embassy notified Washington that The New York Times story was baseless.[51] However, the story was later vindicated, as intelligence sources obtained the charter that told of the functions of the secret Supreme Military Committee (SMC).[52] Walt Rostow briefed President Johnson and concluded that the SMC was "in effect, a scheme for 'guided democracy' in which a half dozen generals would decide finally what was good and bad for the country."[53]

The campaign was overshadowed by US media criticism of Ky and Thieu's unfair electoral practices and sneaky tricks. All the candidates were scheduled to attend a rally at Quang Tri in the far north of August 6. Due to the security situation and the possibility of communist attacks, the politicians were transported to joint campaign events by the military, rather than being free to go to separate events as their strategy dictated.[54] However, the Quang Tri event had to be canceled after the candidates’ plane landed 23 km away at an air base in Dong Ha.[55] Believing that the mishap was a deliberate attempt to make them look chaotic and disorganized—Thieu and Ky had decided not to attend rallies—the candidates boycotted the event and flew back to Saigon. There they denounced the government bitterly. The leading opposition candidate, Tran Van Huong, claimed that Thieu and Ky "purposefully arranged the trip to humiliate us and make clowns out of us."[55] As air force chief, Ky had previously stranded opposition politicians on a trip to the central highlands.[55] Ky and Thieu maintained that no malice was involved, but their opponents did not believe it.[55] None of the candidates made good on their threat to withdraw, but their strident attacks over the alleged dirty tricks dominated the media coverage of the election for a period.[55]

The negative coverage embarrassed Washington; instead of hearing reports about progress and good governance in South Vietnam, most reports focused on corruption and fraud.[55] The heavy and negative coverage of the election provoked angry debate in the US Congress, criticising Ky’s junta and Johnson’s policies. Such sentiment came from both houses and political parties. On August 10, 57 members of the House signed a statement condemning Ky’s electoral malpractices and threatening a review of US policy in Vietnam.[53]

Ky and Thieu were reluctant to campaign and meet the populace as they saw such events as liabilities rather than opportunities to win over the public, and showed little interest in gaining popular support in any case, as they could always could on a rigging of the ballot.[56] The CIA reported that the pair had no intention of participating on the arranged rallies with the civilian candidates because they felt that "possible heckling from the audience that would be too humiliating".[51] Thieu and Ky were correct; they made one public campaign appearance at a rally, where a very disapproving crowd in Hue assailed Ky as a "hooligan" and "cowboy leader".[51]

Ky and Thieu decided to campaign indirectly by appearing at set piece ceremonial appointments, such as transferring land titles to peasants, as hostile elements from the general population were less likely to be present.[51] Thieu took a restrained and more moderate stance during the campaign towards the issue of demoncracy, while Ky, the public face of the ticket and the incumbent government, went on the attack, damaging the pair’s image and supposed commitment to democracy.[51] Ky did not hide his distaste for democracy or his opponents and "described the civilian candidates as 'ordure' [dirt, filth, excrement], 'traitors', and 'destroyers of the national interest'".[51] Ky went on to say that if his opponents continued to attack him, he would cancel the poll.[51]

In the accompanying senate election, Ky openly endorsed 11 slates, but only one was successful in gaining one of the six seats.[57]

1967–1971: Vice President

He served as Vice President to President Nguyen Van Thieu, although behind the scenes there was a fierce rivalry that left Ky marginalized. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive Thieu enforced martial law and used the situation to consolidate his personal power.[58] Ky supporters in the military and the administration were quickly removed from power, arrested, or exiled, ending any hopes of Ky exerting any power through the SMC or elsewhere.[59][60]

Alienated from Thieu, Ky intended to oppose him in the 1971 elections, but Thieu introduced laws to stop most of his rivals from running. Realizing that the poll would be rigged, Ky withdrew from politics. Thieu ran unopposed and took 94% of the vote.[61]

Life in exile

After the defeat of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, on the last day of the fall of Saigon in 1975, Ky left Vietnam aboard the USS Blue Ridge and fled to the US and settled in California where he ran a liquor store.[62][63]

Ky wrote two autobiographies, How We Lost the Vietnam War and Buddha's Child: My Fight to Save Vietnam. The historian James McAllister openly questioned Ky's honesty, saying that Buddha's Child, as Ky called himself, "is filled with unverifiable conversations and arguments that do not at all correspond with the historical record. Like his earlier memoir, it is often a self-serving attempt to continue his ongoing feud with the late President Nguyen Van Thieu."[64] He said that "with everything Ky writes about Vietnam…skepticism is in order".[65]

He made headlines in 2004 by being the first South Vietnamese leader to return to Vietnam after the communist reunification, a move that was seen as a shameful one by many who fled South Vietnam and their descendants.[66][67] Ky had previously been critical of the communists while in exile and had been denied a visa on several occasions.[67] Upon setting foot on communist territory, Ky defended his actions by saying that the Vietnam War was "instigated by foreigners, it was brothers killing each other under the arrangements by foreign countries"[66][67] He added that "In another 100 years, the Vietnamese will look back at the war and feel shameful. We should not dwell on it as it will not do any good for Vietnam's future. My main concern at the moment is Vietnam's position on the world map."[66][67] Ky said that only wanted to help build up Vietnam and promote national harmony, and assailed critics of his return, saying that "Those who bear grudges only care about themselves".[66][67]

Ky later moved back to Vietnam permanently and has campaign for increased foreign investment.[68][69] Ky has been involved in organizing trips to Vietnam for potential US investors.[70][71]

Style

Ky was well-known for his flamboyant and colorful personality[67] and dress during his younger days. His trademark fashion accessory before he faded from public view in the 1970s was a purple scarf, which he wore with his black flight suit. He often raised eyebrows when he was the military prime minister by arriving at events to meet civilians with his wife in matching black leather flight suits, boots, blue caps and purple scarves.[2] He was rarely seen without a cigarette.

He was notorious for his love of gambling, women and glamour, something that made American officials wary of him. One official called him an "unguided missile".[67] When he was a young pilot, Ky once landed a helicopter in the road in front of a girlfriend's house in order to impress her, causing the locals to panic and earning the ire of his commander for misusing military equipment.[66] On one occasion Ky was said to have pulled a handgun on a journalist whose questions annoyed him.[66]

Many in the South Vietnamese public service, military and the general public hated his tempestuous and impetuous style and regarded him as a "cowboy",[66] and "hooligan".[1] During his only public campaign appearance during the 1967 presidential election, the large crowd repeatedly heckled him loudly, calling him a "cowboy leader" and "hooligan" and as a result he did not make any more appearances at rallies.[1]

He met and married his first wife, a Frenchwoman, in the 1950s when he was training as a pilot in France. Soon after he divorced her and married a Air Viet Nam flight attendant, who was his spouse during his years in power.[2] He later married for the third time.[72]

Ky's daughter from his second marriage, Nguyen Cao Ky Duyen, is a well-known personality in the overseas Vietnamese entertainment industry as a master of ceremonies and occasional singer on the music variety show Paris by Night. Many Vietnamese Americans called for her sacking from the role after her father returned to Vietnam.[73]

See also

Notes

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 McAllister, p. 646.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 "South Viet Nam: Pilot with a Mission". Time. 1966-02-18. 
  3. Tang, p. 54.
  4. Moyar (2006), p. 326.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Moyar (2006), p. 327.
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 "South Viet Nam: Continued Progress". Time. 1964-09-18. 
  7. 7.0 7.1 "South Viet Nam: Remaking a Revolution". Time. 1964-09-25. 
  8. 8.0 8.1 Karnow, p. 396.
  9. Kahin, p. 232.
  10. Kahin, p. 498.
  11. 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 Shaplen, pp. 310–312.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 VanDeMark, p. 81.
  13. Moyar (2006), p. 363.
  14. "South Viet Nam: A Trial for Patience". Time. 1965-02-26. 
  15. Kahin, p. 300.
  16. Tang, p. 363.
  17. VanDeMark, p. 80.
  18. Kahin, p. 302.
  19. Moyar (2006), pp. 363–364.
  20. Moyar (2006), p. 364.
  21. VanDeMark, p. 82.
  22. Langguth, pp. 346–347.
  23. 23.0 23.1 Shaplen, pp. 338–344.
  24. Hammer, p. 249.
  25. Ky, p. 116.
  26. 26.0 26.1 Moyar (2004), p. 781.
  27. 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 Moyar (2004), pp. 781–782.
  28. 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 "The Saigon Thi Party". Time. 1966-03-25. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941937,00.html. Retrieved 2009-10-11. 
  29. 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 29.6 29.7 Brush, Peter (April 2005). "The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam". Historynet. http://www.thehistorynet.com/vn/blbuddhist/index1.html. Retrieved 2010-07-16. 
  30. 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.5 30.6 Topmiller, p. 34.
  31. Karnow, p. 460.
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References

External links

Preceded by
?
Vice-President of the Republic of Vietnam
1967–1971
Succeeded by
Tran Van Huong
Preceded by
Phan Huy Quat
Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam
1965–1967
Succeeded by
Nguyen Van Loc